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“We would all like to vote for the best man, but he is never a candidate”
— Kin Hubbard
Abstract
We study mechanisms for candidate selection that seek to minimize the social cost, where
voters and candidates are associated with points in some underlying metric space. The social
cost of a candidate is the sum of its distances to each voter. Some of our work assumes that
these points can be modeled on a real line, but other results of ours are more general.
A question closely related to candidate selection is that of minimizing the sum of distances
for facility location. The difference is that in our setting there is a fixed set of candidates,
whereas the large body of work on facility location seems to consider every point in the
metric space to be a possible candidate. This gives rise to three types of mechanisms which
differ in the granularity of their input space (voting, ranking and location mechanisms). We
study the relationships between these three classes of mechanisms.
While it may seem that Black’s 1948 median algorithm is optimal for candidate selection
on the line, this is not the case. We give matching upper and lower bounds for a variety
of settings. In particular, when candidates and voters are on the line, our universally
truthful spike mechanism gives a [tight] approximation of two. When assessing candidate
selection mechanisms, we seek several desirable properties: (a) efficiency (minimizing the
social cost) (b) truthfulness (dominant strategy incentive compatibility) and (c) simplicity
(a smaller input space). We quantify the effect that truthfulness and simplicity impose on
the efficiency.
1 Introduction
The Hotelling-Downs model ([10], [17]) used to study political strategies, assumes that individual
voters occupy some point along the real line. Non-principled political parties (or ice cream
vendors) strategically position themselves at a point along the left-right axis (or along a beach)
so as to garner the greatest number of supporters (clients). Implicitly, voters will vote for the
closest candidate.
We consider an analogous problem to the Hotelling-Downs model, where candidates are
principled (i.e., non-strategic) whereas the voters have preferences but may misrepresent them
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in order to achieve what is a better outcome from their perspective. In this model, in which
both voters and candidates are represented by points in the metric space, a closer candidate is
preferable to one further away.
Examples for candidate selection:
• A municipality plans to erect a public library on a street, and every resident seeks to be
as close as possible to the proposed library. However, the new library can only be built
on suitable locations (the candidates).
• Social choice issues in which the distance is not physical: there is a set of policies ranging
from left to right, and several political candidates stand for election, each one advocating
a different policy. Every voter is associated with a point along the real line. An example
of a collective decision problem which does not revolve around the political sphere yet may
also fit this setting is the task of determining the temperature of an air conditioner in a
room, where each individual has a different ideal point along the scale of temperatures
(a line). There are many additional settings of relevant candidate selection problems,
e.g., in the realms of recommendation systems, electronic commerce and computational
economics. While our results do not necessarily apply to all social choice settings, there
are many such problems for which they do apply (whether in entirety or partially).
Assuming quasi-linear utilities, and allowing payments — then the well known Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is truthful and can achieve the optimal social cost (see, e.g.,
[20]). However, in many real-life situations we restrict the use of money due to ethical, legal or
other considerations, e.g, in democratic elections and in the examples previously mentioned.
We study deterministic truthful mechanisms with no payments for the candidate selection
problem. In such mechanisms, no agent can benefit from misreporting her location, regardless
of the reported locations of the other agents. Such mechanisms are also known as dominant
strategy incentive compatible mechanisms. We also consider randomized truthful mechanisms,
both universally truthful (ex-post Nash) and truthful in expectation.
Given a set of candidate and voter locations, it is polytime to find the candidate that
minimizes the social cost.
When restricted to deterministic truthful mechanisms, we show that the optimal candidate
cannot be selected in the general case. Moreover, we show that the cost may be as bad as three
times the optimal cost (matching lower and upper bounds). When considering randomized
mechanisms on the line, the approximation factor drops to two (matching upper and lower
bounds).
There are other reasons that an optimal candidate may not be chosen. In particular, this
depends on the amount of information the agents supply to the mechanism. We formulate three
different types of mechanisms, based on the information each agent submits to the mechanism—
• Voting mechanisms, in which each agent casts a vote for her favorite candidate.
• Ranking mechanisms, in which each agent states her ordinal preferences over the candi-
dates.
• Location mechanisms, in which each agent sends her exact position.
Clearly, knowing the true location of an agent allows one to infer the ranking preferred
by that agent, which in turn allows one to infer the favorite candidate of the agent (up to
tie-breaking).
In almost all previous work on the facility location problem every point in the metric space
was considered to be a candidate, therefore there was no difference between these three mech-
anism types.
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The social choice literature mostly considers ranking mechanisms. Recognize that Arrow’s
impossibility theorem does not hold when assuming the preferences are single-peaked.
The more information an agent transmits, the mechanism has more tools to devise an
accurate solution. Albeit, this information comes at a cost, since it might disclose more private
information which the agents wish to keep confidential. Furthermore, behavioral economists
have long argued that the agents cannot obtain the full information pertaining to their utility,
or that obtaining this information requires a high cognitive cost. Additionally, sending more
information also casts a higher burden on the mechanism. For all of these reasons deploying a
simple mechanism 1 which requires less information from agents is advantageous, and generally
there is a trade-off between the accuracy of a mechanism to its simplicity. Indeed, in practice
many election schemes use voting mechanisms rather than ranking mechanisms, largely due to
these desiderata.
1.1 Our Contributions
In the paper, we show the following:
• In Section 3 we formulate a framework of reductions that compare the various mechanism
types. We utilize this framework to show the relations (equivalence or strict containment)
between the three classes of truthful mechanisms – voting, ranking and location (see
Figure 1). Furthermore, we show that for the case of two candidates, the set of truthful in
expectation location mechanisms is equivalent to the set of truthful in expectation voting
mechanisms. These results provide a significant step towards a full characterization of
truthful mechanisms at large.
• In Section 4 we define a family of universally truthful voting mechanisms on the line
called weighted percentile voting (WPV) mechanisms, which choose the i’th vote with
some predetermined probability pi. We introduce the spike mechanism, which is a WPV
mechanism that carefully crafts the probability distribution to account for misreports by
any agent - whether they are near the center or close to the extremes (see Figure 2). We
then use backwards induction to show that spike achieves an approximation ratio of two
(Theorem 8).
• In Section 5 we show additional bounds for randomized mechanisms – On the line there is
a lower bound of two, even for location mechanisms, which shows that the result for spike
is tight. Furthermore, when combining this understanding with the results of Section 3, it
can be concluded that two is also the tight approximation ratio for truthful in expectation
mechanisms (voting, ranking or location) and for universally truthful voting mechanisms.
We move on to show bounds for randomized mechanisms for more general metric spaces2
(see Figure 3). An immediate result is that the random dictator mechanism achieves an
upper bound of three for any metric space. Theorem 14 shows a lower bound of 3 − 2d
for any voting mechanism in <d by using a counterexample based on a regular simplex.
This is enough to conclude that on an arbitrary metric space, the bound of three is tight
for any voting mechanism. Theorem 16 displays a lower bound of 7/3 for any ranking
mechanism in <2 (which also holds in any higher dimension Euclidean space <d).
1We use the term “simplicity” in the perspective of the voters, which have a smaller action space, i.e, less
options to choose from. Upon receiving the input, the mechanism itself can act in an arbitrarily complex fashion.
2We do not present results for deterministic mechanisms in general metric spaces, since in these cases the
incentive compatibility constraints take a significant toll on the approximation ratio – according to Anshelevich
et al. [3] in the non-strategic setting it is possible to reach a constant ratio in any metric space, while due to the
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Median
Voting
Ranking ≈ Location
(a) Deterministic truthful mechanisms
Spike
UT Voting
TIE Voting
TIE Ranking
TIE Location
(b) Randomized mechanisms
Figure 1: The relationships between classes of mechanisms in candidate elections (Theorem 1):
For deterministic truthful mechanisms, the set of ranking mechanisms strictly contains the set
of voting mechanisms, yet the set of location mechanisms is equivalent to the set of ranking
mechanisms. The lower bound on the social cost for any truthful location mechanism on the
line is 3, and it is matched by an upper bound by a voting mechanism - the median mechanism.
In the randomized case, there is a hierarchy of strict containment in the following order - truthful
in expectation (TIE) location mechanisms, TIE ranking mechanisms, TIE voting mechanisms
and universally truthful (UT) voting mechanisms. The lower bound on the social cost of any
location mechanism on the line is 2. We introduce the spike mechanism, which is a universally
truthful voting mechanism, which achieves a matching upper bound of 2.
Refer to Section 3 for formal definitions of equivalence and strict containment in our setting.
• In Section 6 we present deterministic bounds on the line – there is a lower bound of three,
which is met by a matching upper bound due to the median mechanism. All the results
on the line, deterministic or randomized, are displayed in the table in Figure 4.
Recognize the following surprising phenomenon apparent in Figure 4. In both determin-
istic and randomized cases, any constraint in either information or truthfulness, yields
the same ratio as taking the both of these constraints simultaneously — when insisting
on truthful mechanisms (in the strategic case), there is no trade-off between high and
low information settings, and one can enjoy the benefits of minimal information mecha-
nisms (voting mechanisms) without incurring any additional cost to the approximation
ratio; Similarly, when deciding to reduce the information requirements to anything less
than location mechanisms, it is possible to devise a truthful [voting] mechanism, without
increasing the approximation ratio.
1.2 Related Work
Voting systems have been a domain of prolific research for decades. The seminal Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem [15] shows that if the rankings of agents can be arbitrary and the
amount of candidates is greater than two, then the only onto truthful mechanisms are dic-
tatorships. However, if there are limitations on the rankings, then the impossibility theorem
characterization of Schummer and Vohra [24] there exist metric spaces in which the approximation ratio is Ω(n)
even in the continuous model.
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Figure 2: The density function of the spike mechanism, which gives rise to the mechanism’s
name (the cumulative distribution function is written explicitly in Definition 4). In this example
there are 10000 agents and 4 candidates. The 4 candidates, when ordered from left to right,
receive 2000, 2000, 3000 and 3000 votes respectively. The votes are arranged in ascending
order (with ties broken arbitrarily), and the graph depicts probability of each vote being chosen
– votes are chosen with higher probability when they are closer to the 50th percentile. The
area beneath the graph represents the probability that each candidate will be elected, e.g., the
probability of choosing the second candidate (p2) is the integral of the function between 2000
and 4000.
of Gibbard-Satterthwaite does not hold. In many cases the rankings can be limited to single-
peaked preferences, a notion used as early as 1948 by Black [4]. In 1980 Moulin showed a
complete characterization of truthful deterministic mechanisms for single-peaked preferences
[19]. Schummer and Vohra [24] extended this characterization to cycles and general graphs.
There has been extensive work describing various candidate selection mechanisms, which
have been generally divided to 3 main types ([6], [26]) — scoring rules (e.g., plurality, Borda,
anti-plurality, range voting, cumulative), Condorcet extensions (e.g., Copeland, maxmin, Dodg-
son, Young, ranked pairs), or other mechanisms (e.g., single transferable vote, Bucklin). Some
work on social choice also made use of randomized voting schemes, for instance in order to
improve the results of the mechanisms [21] or to make manipulation computationally hard
([8] pages 632-633). Most of these mechanisms have no assumptions on the preferences of the
agents, and are rankings mechanisms (i.e., they receive the ordinal preferences of the voters as
input). Since in these circumstances the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem holds,
the mechanisms are typically not truthful. While the importance of truthfulness and of simple
mechanisms (with less options for each voter) has been acknowledged, to the best of our knowl-
edge there has not been a formal framework for reduction or an assessment of the relationships
between the different types of mechanisms.
Since in the lack of cardinal costs no global objective functions can be measured (e.g, the
social cost), the focus of many of the aforementioned mechanisms is on achieving some desirable
axiomatic properties. Nonetheless, the use of utilitarianism in the realm of social choice has
firm and ancient roots (see, e.g, a 1952 paper by Fleming [12] and a 1955 work by Harsanyi
[16]). Moreover, a new line of work commenced in recent years regarding distortion, which also
refers to the utilitarian goal of minimizing social cost (partly due emergence of new domains
such as recommender systems and e-commerce, as previously noted). The term was coined in
2006 by Procaccia and Rosenschein [22], and it was later used, for instance, by Boutilier et. al.
[5]. Recently, Anshelevich et al. [3] assessed the distortion of several voting rules, and provided
lower bounds on them. In [3], the distortion is the worst case ratio between the social cost of the
candidate elected and the social cost of the optimal candidate, over any ranking profile (that is,
preference profile) in any metric space. The distortion is a quite similar to the approximation
ratio used in this paper, but it differs in two key properties –
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Strategic Non-Strategic
Voting (low information) LB 3− 2d+1 (Thm. 14) 2 (Lemma 17)
UB 3 (Lemma 18) 3 (Lemma 18)
Ranking LB 7/3 (Thm. 16) 2 (Lemma 17)
UB 3 (Lemma 18) 3 (Lemma 18)
Location (high information) LB 2 (Obs. 15) 1
UB 3 (Lemma 18) 1
Figure 3: Summary of our results for randomized mechanisms in <d. The columns correspond
to the truthfulness constraints (in the strategic setting the mechanism must be truthful in
expectation), whereas the rows correspond to the information constraints (voting, ranking or
location mechanisms). The rows are further divided to show the lower bound (LB) and upper
bound (UB) of each such cell. Note that for non-strategic location mechanisms the result is
always optimal by definition, since there are neither information nor strategic constraints.
In the strategic setting there is a difference between the lower bounds for voting, ranking and
location mechanisms.
Most of the results here are rather straightforward, except for the upper bounds of 3− 2d+1 and
of 7/3, which are more involved.
• Most importantly, the source of the imperfection depicted by the distortion is the mecha-
nism’s lack of information (the mechanism has access to the ordinal ranking of the agents,
but not to their exact location, that is - not to their full cardinal utilities). In this paper,
the approximation ratio is greater than one both because of this information deficiency
(in the cases or ranking and voting mechanisms), and because of incentive compatibility
constraints. In this sense, we can quantify the cost of limited information as well as the
cost of truthfulness in various settings.
• The distortion calculates the worst-case ratio in any metric space, whereas the approxi-
mation ratio is sometimes calculated over a specific metric space.
Anshelevich et al. show a deterministic lower bound of 3 on the distortion, and they prove
that two mechanisms (social choice functions), Copeland and Uncovered Set, achieve a distortion
of 5.
Procaccia and Tennenholtz introduced game theoretical aspects to the facility location prob-
lem. As mentioned before, their setting is similar to the one in this paper, except that the
location of the facility is not restricted to a set of candidates, but instead can be located at any
point on the line. This model was extended by these authors and by others in many different
ways. The metric space researched spanned from a line ([14], [23]) to a circle ([1], [2]), a tree
([1], [11]) or a general graph ([1]). There are many papers regarding building several facilities
(or electing a committee of candidates), where the cost of an agent is her distance to the closest
facility ([13], [14], [18], [23]). As opposed to the voting scenario, the goal of the vast majority
of these papers was to optimize over some global target function, and the most popular target
functions were the utilitarian (social cost) and egalitarian (the maximal cost of an agent) (see,
e.g, [1], [14], [23]), but there were also works regarding additional target functions like the L2
norm (the sum of the squared distances of the agents, see [11]). Some papers consider “obnox-
ious facility location” — a setting in which agents want to be as far away as possible from the
facility, e.g., when selecting a location for a central garbage dump ([7]).
When the outcome is constrained to a set of candidates, the facility location literature is far
less extensive. In this setting, a recent paper by Sui and Boutilier defines a set of deterministic
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Deterministic Randomized
Strategic Non-Strategic Strategic Non-Strategic
Voting 3 3 2 2
(low information) (LB:Lm. 19, (LB:Thm. 3 in [3], (LB:Lm. 17, (LB:Lm. 15,
UB:Lm. 21) UB:Lm. 21) UB:Thm. 8 ) UB:Thm.8)
Ranking 3 3 2 2
(LB:Lm. 19, (LB: Thm. 3 in [3], (LB:Lm. 17, (LB:Obs. 15,
UB:Lm. 21) UB: Lm. 21) UB:Thm. 8 ) UB:Lm. 21)
Location 3 1 2 1
(high information) (LB:Lm. 19, (LB:Lm. 17,
UB:Lm. 21) UB:Thm. 8 )
Figure 4: The approximation ratios of mechanisms on the line (<) in various settings. All the
results in the table are tight. In particular the upper bound in strategic case is due to the spike
mechanism.
mechanisms which is GSP on the line and -GSP on <n [25]. The paper does not show bounds
on global objectives such as the social cost.
Dokow et al. [9] characterize deterministic truthful mechanisms on the discrete line and the
discrete circle. They move on to give a lower bound on the social cost for large circles, and to
the best of our knowledge this is the only result regarding assessment of the social cost in a
constrained setting. It is worthy to note the model in [9] has 2 major properties which differ
from the one in this paper: (a) The discrete constraints of the locations apply to the agents as
well as to the candidates, so all agents are located precisely on some candidate; (b) The distance
between any two neighboring candidates must be constant (for instance: 1,2,3,4,...).
2 Model
Let N = {1 . . . n} be a set of agents, where each agent i ∈ N is located at some point xi. We
refer to the location of agent i as agent i’s type. Let x = (x1 . . . xn) be the location profile of the
agents. There exists a fixed set of candidates C = {C1 . . . Cm}. Each candidate Cj , is located at
point yj , and this location is publicly known. The agents and candidates are located on some
metric space. A significant part of the paper deals with specific metric spaces, and these will
be specifically noted. In the parts where the metric space is <, it is assumed that the agents
and the candidates are both numbered in ascending order based on their locations (otherwise
they could be renamed in this manner).
A deterministic mechanism M , is a function which maps an action profile a = {a1 . . . an} ∈
An to a candidate, that is: M : An → C. We consider three classes of mechanisms that differ
in the input they accept, i.e., in the action space A of the agents:
• Voting mechanisms, in which each agent casts a vote for a candidate, that is: ai ∈ C.
• Ranking mechanisms, in which every agent reports ordinal preferences over all the m
candidates. The notation Cj  Ck indicates a preference of candidate Cj over candidate
Ck (or is indifferent between the two). In ranking mechanisms ai ∈ Π, where Π is the set
of all permutations of the set of candidates C. These mechanisms are sometimes referred
to in the literature as social choice functions.
• Location mechanisms, in which every agent reports their location, that is ai is some point
in the metric space.
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Given a joint action profile a, the cost of point x is its distance to the facility, that is:
costx(M,a) = |x−M(a)|. For agent i ∈ N located at point xi, we refer to costxi(M,a) as the
cost of agent i. The goal of each agent is to minimize her cost.
Truthful mechanisms are usually defined in the context of direct revelation mechanisms.
Since in ranking and voting mechanisms the action space does not coincide with the type space,
we extend this notion in the following trivial manner for these cases as well. For an agent
in location xi and for any mechanism (location, ranking or voting), let A(xi) be the set of
true actions of this agent — the actions which convey the real preferences of this agent. For
instance, in voting mechanisms A(xi) is the set of candidates closest to xi, which we refer to as
the favorite candidates of xi (this might be a set since there may be ties). An agent reporting
ai ∈ A(xi) is said to be reporting truthfully, and an action profile a in which all agents report
truthfully is called a truthful profile. The set of truthful profiles is denoted A(x). A truthful
mechanism M is one in which no agent can suffer from reporting truthfully, regardless of the
actions of the other agents:
∀i ∈ N, ∀xi, ∀ai ∈ A(xi),∀a−i ∈ An−1,∀a′i ∈ A : costxi (M, (ai, a−i)) ≤ costxi
(
M, (a′i, a−i)
)
A randomized mechanism is a mapping from an action profile to a distribution over the
candidates, that is: M : An → ∆(C). The cost of agent i is the expected cost of this agent
according to the probability distribution returned by the mechanism, that is: costxi(M,a) =
ECj∼M(a)|xi − yj |.
Two different notions of randomized truthful mechanisms have been studied in the literature,
and we extend them naturally based on our definitions of truthful reports:
• Truthful in expectation (TIE) mechanisms — where the expected cost of an agent reporting
truthfully is never higher than any other action. That is: ∀i ∈ N , ∀ai ∈ A(xi), ∀a−i ∈
An−1, ∀a′i ∈ A: costxi (M, (ai, a−i)) ≤ costxi (M, (a′i, a−i)). In these mechanisms the agent
may regret her action ex-post for some of the instances.
• Universally truthful mechanisms are mechanisms which can be expressed as a probability
distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms. In these mechanisms an agent never
regrets reporting truthfully, even after the random outcome is unraveled.
Clearly, every universally truthful mechanism is truthful in expectation mechanisms, but not
necessarily vice versa. Throughout the paper, in the randomized setting we use the term
“truthful” to refer to truthful in expectation mechanisms, unless otherwise stated.
The social cost of a mechanism is the sum of the agents’ costs. For a location profile x and
an action profile a the social cost is: SC(M,x,a) =
∑
i costxi(M,a). The cost of a candidate
is the cost of the mechanism which locates the facility on that candidate, that is: SC(Cj ,x) =∑
i∈N |yj − xi|. Given a location profile x, the optimal mechanism, denoted OPT(x), is one
which chooses a candidate that minimizes the social cost (Copt). For the sake of consistency,
when there are several optimal candidates, we refer to the leftmost among them as Copt. For any
truthful in expectation mechanism M (including universally truthful mechanisms), the social
cost of M given a location profile x is the maximal social cost it yields by any truthful action
profile a, that is: SC(M,x) = maxa∈A(x) SC(M,x,a). The approximation ratio of a truthful in
expectation mechanism M is the maximal ratio for any location profile x, between social cost
of M given x and the optimal social cost given x: maxx
SC(M,x)
SC(OPT,x) .
We make use of several terms which are relevant for voting mechanisms:
• The location of a vote ai (some candidate) is denoted y(ai).
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y1 y2 y3b1 b2
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5
V1 V2 V3
Figure 5: Illustration of candidates (white circles), agents (black circles), voting borders and
voting zones when the metric space is <.
For example, in this case the favorite candidate of x3 is C2: C(x3) = {C2}. The voting borders
divide the distance between two consecutive candidates exactly in half, for example: |b1− y1| =
|y2 − b1|.
• When the network is the line, then there is an inherent order of the votes, and therefore it
is possible to make use of percentiles. A percentile mechanism is a voting mechanism that
elects the i’th percentile vote (for example, the mechanism which chooses the leftmost
vote is the 0 percentile mechanism).
• A weighted percentile voting (WPV) mechanism locates the facility on the i’th percentile
vote with some probability pi, where {pi} does not depend on the action profile a. For
example, “random dictator” is a WPV mechanism which chooses any vote ai with prob-
ability 1n .
In voting mechanisms, the set of candidates C induces a partition of the line in the following
manner — the voting zone of candidate Ci, denoted Vi, is the set of points whose favorite
candidate is Ci: Vi = {x : ∀Cj : |x − Ci| ≤ |x − Cj |}. The voting zones are bounded by voting
borders. For example, when the metric space is <, there are n − 1 borders, which are the
midpoints between two consecutive candidates: bi =
yi+yi+1
2 (see Figure 5). When the metric
space is <d, the voting zones create a Voronoi diagram. A candidate which has at least one
agent in their zone is called active.
In ranking mechanisms, C induces a partition which divides the line into ranking zones. All
points in some ranking zone Ri share some ranking pii. In this case, we say that the ranking
pii is consistent with ranking zone Ri. The ranking zones bounded by ranking borders. For
example, when the metric space is < the ranking borders are the midpoints between any two
candidates: bi,j =
yi+yj
2 .
3 Classes of Mechanisms
In this section we go over the containment hierarchy of various classes of truthful mechanisms
(e.g., Figure 1). We start with some intuition, then defining some necessary terms, and finally
present the main theorem of this section.
Intuitively, for any mechanism M , there exists a mechanism M ′ which receives a “richer”
input than M , and acts identically to M . For instance, for some arbitrary voting mechanism M ,
there obviously exists a ranking mechanism M ′ which disregards all of the preferences except
the top choice of each agent, and behaves essentially just like M does.
We generalize this notion in the following informal definition — a mechanism M (whether
location/ranking/or voting) is said to be reducible to a mechanism M ′ (location/ranking/or
voting) if for every location profile x and true reports, the output of M is identical to the
output of M ′ (a formal definition, which is based on M simulating M ′, is deferred to appendix
A.1).
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As pointed out, it is clear that every voting mechanism M is reducible to some ranking
mechanism M ′ (or some location mechanism M ′). In these cases, if M is truthful then so is
M ′, since M ′ only uses the information which is inputted to M , so any misreports to M ′ which
would not change the input of M do not affect the outcome at all. Note that the same reasoning
also shows that every ranking mechanism is reducible to some location mechanism, and that
any voting mechanism is reducible to some location mechanism.
On the other hand, it is not true that every ranking mechanism is reducible to some voting
mechanism. Somewhat surprisingly, we will soon show that when we restrict ourselves to de-
terministic truthful mechanism this does hold, that is — every deterministic truthful ranking
mechanism is reducible to some deterministic truthful voting mechanism.
Two sets of mechanisms, A and B, are said to be equivalent if every a ∈ A is reducible to
some b ∈ B, and every b ∈ B is reducible to some a ∈ A.
A set of mechanisms A is said to be strictly contained in a set of mechanisms B if every
mechanism a ∈ A is reducible to some mechanism b ∈ B, yet not every mechanism b ∈ B is
reducible to some mechanism a ∈ A. This is a slight abuse of terminology since the sets A and
B may be disjoint, as their input space may be different.
The following theorem shows several claims regarding relations (equivalence or strict con-
tainment) between sets of truthful mechanisms. Notice that not only does this theorem show
the hierarchy of the different classes, but it also provides notions relevant to characterization
of truthful mechanisms. For instance, the second claim proves that no mechanism can use
any information regarding the location of the agents beyond their ranking, while maintaining
truthfulness. In addition, in the claims showing strict containment, the examples in the proofs
portray the expressiveness that the additional information gives the mechanism.
Theorem 1. The following claims hold in the Euclidean metric space <d (for any d ∈ N):
1. The set of truthful deterministic ranking mechanisms strictly contains the set of truthful
deterministic voting mechanisms.
2. The set of truthful deterministic location mechanisms is equivalent to the set of truthful
deterministic ranking mechanisms.
3. The set of truthful in expectation randomized ranking mechanisms strictly contains the set
of truthful in expectation randomized voting mechanisms.
4. The set of truthful in expectation randomized location mechanisms strictly contains the set
of truthful in expectation randomized ranking mechanisms.
5. The set of truthful in expectation randomized voting mechanisms strictly contains the set
of universally truthful randomized voting mechanisms.
6. When there are two candidates, the set of truthful in expectation randomized location mech-
anisms is equivalent to the set of truthful in expectation randomized voting mechanisms.
For the ease of readability, we defer the proof of this theorem to the appendix (see A.1).
4 Spike Mechanism
In the next sections we will prove that both the median mechanism and the random dictator
mechanism achieve an approximation ratio of three on <. However, the cause for this ratio in
these two cases is different - for median it is due to an instance which is bad for the median
agent, while for random dictator it is due to a bad instance for an agent in one of the extremes.
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It is therefore desirable to devise a mechanism which is resistant to bad instances of any agent.
The spike mechanism stems from this intuition.
This section contains foundations needed for the introduction of the spike mechanism, the
definition of the mechanism, and the theorem showing that spike achieves an approximation
ratio of 2. In the entirety of this section, the metric space is < and the mechanisms are voting
mechanisms.
We start by showing a basic lemma regarding WPV mechanisms. Recall that these are
voting mechanisms which choose the i’th percentile vote with a predetermined probability pi.
Lemma 2. Any weighted percentile voting mechanism M is universally truthful.
The proof is straightforward and deferred to appendix A.2.
Definition 3 (Cumulative count of a candidate). Given a voting profile a, the cumulative count
of candidate Ci is the amount of agents who voted for any candidate who is not located to the
right of yi, that is: t(i) = |j ∈ N : y(aj) ≤ yi|.
Definition 4 (Spike Mechanism). The spike mechanism is a WPV mechanism 3 that for each
voting profile a, chooses candidate Ci according to the following cumulative distribution function:
F (i) =
{
t(i)
2(n−t(i)) if t(i) ≤ n/2
1.5− n2t(i) if t(i) > n/2
The mechanism is named after the shape of the density function it creates (see Figure 2).
Recognize that the result of the mechanism depends on the amount of votes that each candidate
received and on the order of the candidate along the line, but not on the distances between the
candidates.
Observation 5. Spike defines a symmetric distribution, that is: ∀i : F (i) = 1− F (n− i).
Proof. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2, then:
F (i) =
i
2(n− i)
1− F (n− i) = 1−
(
1.5− n
2(n− i)
)
=
n
2(n− i) −
1
2
=
n− (n− i)
2(n− i) =
i
2(n− i)
We now define a few terms needed for the proof of the approximation ratio. Recall that
Copt is uniquely defined for a location profile x, since ties are broken in favor of the leftmost
candidate. We denote the set of borders {bi}m−1i=1 by B.
Definition 6 (Tight profile of x, see Figure 6a). Given a location profile x, the profile x′ is
said to be the tight profile of x if it moves all agents who are not on a border as close as possible
to Copt within their zones, that is:
∀i : x′i =

xi if xi ∈ B
yopt if xi ∈ Vopt \B
bj if xi ∈ Vj \B and j < OPT
bj−1 if xi ∈ Vj \B and j > OPT
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Figure 6: Tight profile
y1 y2 = yopt y3 y4
b1 = IB(x1) b2 = IB(x3) b3
x1 x2 x3 x4
(a) The original profile x.
y1 y2 = yopt y3 y4
b1 b2 b3
x1
x2
x3 x4
(b) The tight profile of x. The arrows represent the movements between the two profiles.
Figure 7: Left-compressed profile
y5
y4 = yopt
y3y2y1
b4b3b2b1
x5x4x3x2x1
(a) x, the original tight profile.
y5
y4 = yopt
y3y2y1
b4b3b2b1
x5x4x3x1, x2
(b) The left-compressed profile of x (after x1 moves to b2).
Definition 7 (Left-compressed profile of x, see Figure 7a). Given a tight location profile x,
a left-compressed profile of x moves all the agents on the leftmost border to their neighboring
border on the right, if this border is left of yopt. Formally: let the location of the leftmost agent
be x1 = bj, then the left-compressed profile of x is:
∀i : x′i =
{
bj+1 if (xi = bj) ∧ (bj+1 < yopt)
xi otherwise.
Note that the left compressed profile of a tight profile is also a tight profile. The right-
compressed profile of x is defined in a completely symmetrical fashion.
After compressing location profiles, there are likely to be locations in which there are
many agents. We therefore use the following notation: the location profile is written as
x = {(xˆ1, n1), ..., (xˆk, nk)}, which means that for each j : 1 ≤ j ≤ k, there are nj agents
located at xˆj .
We now use these definitions to prove the main result of this section:
3Spike is a WPV mechanism since it chooses the i’th percentile vote with some probability pi, and pi does
not depend on the reports.
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Theorem 8. The spike mechanism is universally truthful, and it achieves an approximation
ratio of 2 on <.
Proof. Spike is a WPV mechanism, so according to Lemma 2 it is universally truthful.
The analysis of the approximation ratio is more involved and is based on backwards induction
which follows these steps (see Figure 8):
1. Figure 8a: Start with a general location profile x, and compute its optimal candidate,
Copt.
2. Figure 8b: Let x(1) be the tight profile of x. We show that the transition from x to x(1)
cannot decrease the approximation ratio (Lemma 9).
3. Figure 8c: Let x(2) be the left-compression of x(1). We show that if the ratio of x(2) is not
higher than 2, then so is the ratio of x(1) (Lemma 10).
4. Figure 8d: Repeat left and right compressions until we can no longer compress. At this
stage, the profile is tight with at most 3 active candidates, and we note this profile x(3).
We show that the approximation ratio of x(3) is not above 2 (Lemma 11).
Proving these steps is sufficient to complete the proof of the theorem, since in Lemma 11 we
show that the ratio of x(3) is not higher than 2 (the base case). According to Lemma 10, this
implies that the ratio of x(1) (prior to all of the compressions) is also not higher than 2 (the
induction steps). Since the ratio of the x is not higher than that of x(1), this means that the
approximation ratio of x is not above 2, as needed.
Notice that throughout this process Copt remains the optimal candidate, since it was optimal
in the original profile x, and in each step all agents move towards it, so the cost of any other
candidate can decrease by no more than what the cost of Copt decreases.
Truthful reports to the spike mechanism (like any other voting mechanism) are not neces-
sarily unique since an agent i who is located on a border can report either of the two candidates
closest to her. For these cases of ties, we show that the worst-case ratio always occurs when the
agents vote for the candidate located farther away from Copt (Lemma 30, whose formal definition
and proof are deferred to the appendix A.2).
We now present the lemmas formally. The proofs of the lemmas, which are given in the
appendix, prove the backwards induction and conclude the proof of the theorem at large.
Lemma 9. Let x be an arbitrary location profile, let x′ be the tight profile of x and let M be
an arbitrary WPV mechanism. Then the approximation ratio of M given x′ is not lower than
that of M given x:
SC(M,x)
SC(OPT,x)
≤ SC(M,x
′)
SC(OPT,x′)
.
The previous lemma holds for any WPV mechanism, in particular for spike.
Lemma 10. Let x be a tight location profile, let x′ be the left-compressed profile of x and let
S be the spike mechanism. Then if the approximation ratio of S given x′ is not higher than 2,
then so is that of S given x:
SC(S,x′)
SC(OPT,x′)
≤ 2⇒ SC(S,x)
SC(OPT,x)
≤ 2
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Figure 8: Illustration of the proof of Theorem 8:
y1 y2 y3 y4 = yopt y5 y6
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8
(a) Initial state: A general location profile x
y1 y2 y3 y4 = yopt y5 y6
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
xˆ1
n1 = 1
xˆ2
n2 = 2
xˆ3
n3 = 1
xˆ4
n4 = 1 xˆ5
n5 = 2
xˆ6
n6 = 1
(b) x(1): The tight profile of x, using the notation in which there are ni agents at point xˆi.
y1 y2 y3 y4 = yopt y5 y6
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
xˆ1
n1 = 3
xˆ2
n2 = 1
xˆ3
n3 = 1 xˆ4
n4 = 2
xˆ5
n5 = 1
(c) x(2): The left-compressed profile of x(1) (moves n1 agents from b1 to b2).
y1 y2 yL
y3
yC
y4 = yopt
yR
y5
y6
bL bC
xˆ1
L =
opt−1∑
i=1
ni = 4
xˆ2
C = nopt = 1 xˆ3
R =
n∑
i=opt+1
ni = 3
β β 1 1
(d) x(3): The final profile after reapplying left and right compressions on x(2) repeatedly. The active
candidates are denoted yL, yC and yR, the amount of agents as L, C and R respectively, and we scale
the distances to bC−yC2 = 1 and
yC−bL
2 = β.
Since the cumulative function defining the spike mechanism is symmetrical, the claim can
be trivially extended to right-compressions as well.
After reapplying compressions on both sides, the resulting profile has agents in three loca-
tions at most (see Figure 8d). The last lemma in the proof states that in this final stage, the
ratio is not higher than 2:
Lemma 11. Let x be a tight location profile in which there are at most 3 active candidates:
yopt−1 < yopt < yopt+1. The ratio of the S given x is not higher than 2:
SC(S,x)
SC(OPT,x) ≤ 2.
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5 Additional Results for Randomized Mechanisms
5.1 Lower Bounds
In this section show lower bounds of randomized mechanisms in different settings. When the
network is <, we present a lower bound of 2 for any truthful in expectation mechanism, even if
it is a location mechanism. By the hierarchy presented in Theorem 1, this lower bound trivially
holds for truthful in expectation ranking and voting mechanisms as well (see Figure 1). Ergo,
spike is optimal over all truthful in expectation mechanisms.
Additionally, we show a lower bound of 2 for any randomized ranking mechanism, even when
the mechanism need not be truthful (in the non-strategic setting). These results prove that the
approximation ratio achieved by spike is tight. For more general metric spaces the lower bound
changes — In <d, we show a lower bound for any truthful voting mechanism of 3 − 2d+1 . We
also present a lower bound of 7/3 for any truthful ranking mechanism in <2 (this bound also
holds for <d, for any d > 2).
We start by proving a helpful lemma. Informally, the lemma states that when there is
an agent located on a border (and can therefore submit several different truthful actions to
a ranking or voting mechanism), her cost should not change under any truthful report she
submits.
Lemma 12. For any truthful in expectation ranking mechanism M in any metric space, let bi,j
be the border between ranking zones Ri,Rj. Let pii, pij be the rankings consistent with Ri,Rj
respectively. Let agent l be located on this border, that is: xl ∈ bi,j.
Then the cost at point xl remains the same whether the agent reports pii or pij, that is:
costxl(M, (al = pii, a−l)) = costxl(M, (al = pij , a−l))
The proof is given in appendix A.3.
Observation 13. The previous lemma also holds for voting mechanisms.
The proof of the observation follows the exact same lines as the proof of the lemma.
Theorem 14. In the d dimensional real space <d, any truthful in expectation voting mechanism
has an approximation ratio of at least 3− 2d+1 .
Proof. Let there be d+ 1 candidates, located on the vertices of a regular simplex H (all d+ 1
vertices are equally distanced from one another). Let there be d + 1 agents, and let M be an
arbitrary truthful in expectation voting mechanism.
Let x be the profile in which each agent i is located precisely on candidate Ci. Therefore
a = (C1, C2 . . . Cd+1) is the only truthful voting profile for x. Denote the probability of choosing
candidate i as pi(a), that is: pi(a) = Pr(M(a) = Ci). Clearly there exists some candidate
which is chosen by M with probability at least 1d+1 . Assume without loss of generality that this
candidate is Cd+1, that is: pd+1(a) ≥ 1d+1 .
We move on to define another location profile, x′, which is also consistent with the voting
profile a. Let H ′ be the regular simplex in which candidates C \ Cd+1 are on the vertices. Let
P be the point with equal distance to all d vertices in H ′ (H ′ is a regular simplex, so such a
point necessarily exists). Denote this distance as t. However, this distance is different from the
distance from P to Cd+1: |P − yd+1| = u 6= t. Let x′ be the profile in which there are k agents
at P and one agent at Cd+1 (see Figure 9).
According to Observation 13, the cost of an agent at point P should not change under
any truthful vote, that is for any vote Cj : 1 ≤ j ≤ d. In particular, this holds when any
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agent on point P votes for candidate C1. We make use of this observation several times by
changing the votes for each of the points at P to C1, one at a time, such that the final voting
profile is a′ = {C1, C1 . . . C1, Cd+1} (d agents vote for C1, one agent votes for Cd+1).. Due to the
observation, the cost of point P must remain the same throughout these transitions, that is:
costP (M,a
′) = costP (M,a).
Therefore:
costP (M,a) = costP (M,a
′)
⇒ u · pd+1(a) + t · (1− pd+1(a)) = u · pd+1(a′) + t · (1− pd+1(a′))
⇒ t+ (u− t) · pd+1(a) = t+ (u− t) · pd+1(a′)
⇒ pd+1(a′) = pd+1(a)
⇒ pd+1(a′) ≥ 1
d+ 1
Denote the midpoint between y1 and yd+1 as Q. Without loss of generality, scale the
distances such that |y1 − Q| = |Q − yd+1| = 1. Examine the following location profile x′′ =
(C1, C1 . . . C1, Q), which is also consistent with the voting profile a′. In this case the cost of C1,
which is the optimal candidate, is: SC(C1,x′′) = 1. The cost of Cd+1 is SC(Cd+1,x′′) = d ·2+1 =
2d+ 1. Therefore the approximation ratio of M is at least:
SC(M,x′′)
SC(OPT,x′′)
= pd+1(a
′)(2d+ 1) + (1− pd+1(a′))(1)
= 2d · pd+1(a′) + 1
≥ (2d) 1
d+ 1
+ 1
=
2d+ 2− 2
d+ 1
+ 1 = 3− 2
d+ 1
y1, x1
y2, x2
y3, x3
P
Q
y1
y2
y3, x3
Q
P, x1, x2
y1, x1, x2
y2
y3
P
Q, x3
1
Figure 9: An illustration of the proof of Theorem 14 for the case of d = 2.
The three candidates are on the vertices of an equilateral triangle (a regular simplex with 3
vertices). The lines within the triangle denote the borders between a pair of candidates. The
simplex H ′ is the line between y1, y2, and its midpoint is P .
These three figures, from left to right, show the dynamics of the proof (location profiles x,x′
and x′′ respectively). The key observation is that the agents at point P are at equal distance
to all candidates except C3, therefore the transition does not change the probability of C3 to be
chosen.
Observation 15. Any truthful in expectation location mechanism has an approximation ratio
of at least 2, even on the line.
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Proof. Let there be two candidates on the line. According to Theorem 1, any truthful in
expectation location mechanism is equivalent to a voting mechanism. One can apply the same
proof as in Theorem 14 for the case of d = 1 (in this case, both point P and point Q are the
midpoint between the two candidates), to achieve a lower bound of 3− 2d+1 = 2.
Theorem 16. In <2, any truthful in expectation ranking mechanism has an approximation
ratio of at least 7/3.
Proof. Let there be 3 candidates located such that they form an equilateral triangle, and let M
be a truthful in expectation ranking mechanism. Let a = (a1, a2, a3) be the following ranking
profile:
a1 = C1  C2  C3
a2 = C2  C3  C1
a3 = C3  C1  C2
Let x be some location profile consistent with a (see Figure 10). Denote pi(a) = Pr[M(a) = Ci].
From symmetry, there exists some candidate chosen with probability at least 1/3. Assume
without loss of generality that this is candidate C3, that is: p3(a) ≥ 1/3.
Let P1 be a point such that |P1−y1| = |P1−y2| = t1, and |P1−y3| = u1, where t1 6= u1. Let
x′ = (P1, x2, x3). Let a′1 = C2  C1  C3 and let a′ = (a′1, a2, a3). Notice that x′ is consistent
with both a and a′, therefore according to Lemma 12 the cost at P1 should remain the same
for a,a′:
costP1(M,a) = costP1(M,a
′)
⇒ u1 · p3(a) + t1 · (1− p3(a)) = u1 · p3(a′) + t1 · (1− p3(a′))
⇒ t1 + (u1 − t1) · p3(a) = t1 + (u1 − t1) · p3(a′)
⇒ p3(a′) = p3(a)
⇒ p3(a′) ≥ 1
3
Let P2 be a point such that |P2 − y2| = |P2 − y1| = t2, and |P2 − y3| = u2, where t2 6= u2.
Let x′′ = (x′1, x2, P2). Let a′′3 = C3  C2  C1 and let a′′ = (a′1, a2, a′′3). According to Lemma 12
the cost at P2 should remain the same for a
′,a′′:
costP2(M,a
′) = costP2(M,a
′′)
⇒ u2 · p3(a) + t2 · (1− p3(a′)) = u2 · p3(a′′) + t2 · (1− p3(a′′))
⇒ p3(a′′) = p3(a′)
⇒ p3(a′′) ≥ 1
3
Let Q be the midpoint between y2, y3, and let x
′′′ = (y2, y2, Q). Without loss of generality,
scale the distances such that |y3 − Q| = |Q − y2| = 1. Therefore the cost of C2, the optimal
candidate, is: SC(C2,x′′′,a′′) = SC(OPT,x′′′,a′′) = 1. The cost of C3 is: SC(C3,x′′′,a′′) =
2 · 2 + 1 = 5. Therefore the approximation ratio of M is at least:
SC(M,x′′′,a′′)
SC(OPT,x′′′,a′′)
= p3(a
′′) · 5 + (1− p3(a′′)) · 1 = 1 + 4 · p3(a′′) ≥ 1 + 4
3
=
7
3
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y1
y2
y3
x1
x2
x3
y1
y2
y3
P1, x1
x2
x3
y1
y2
y3
P1, x1
x2
P2, x3
y1
y2, x1, x2
y3
Q, x3
1
Figure 10: An illustration of the proof of Theorem 16.
These four figures, from left to right, show the dynamics of the proof (profiles x, x′, x′′ and x′′′
respectively).
Lemma 17. No randomized ranking mechanism can achieve an approximation ratio strictly
below 2, even if the metric is < and even if there are no truthfulness requirements from the
mechanism (non-strategic case).
The proof is deferred to appendix A.3.
5.2 Upper Bound
We previously showed that spike achieves an approximation ratio of 2 on the line. We now show
that for a general metric space, random dictator achieves a ratio of 3.
Random dictator is a simple randomized mechanism which achieves an approximation ratio
of 2 in the continuous model. Recall that random dictator locates the facility on vote ai with
probability 1/n for all i ∈ N . We show that in our model, it yields a competitive ratio of 3 for
any metric space (but it cannot improve beyond 3 even on the line).
Lemma 18. On any metric space, random dictator achieves an approximation ratio of exactly
3.
The proof can be found in appendix A.3.
As opposed to the continuous model, in our candidate model random dictator is not group-
strategyproof. Refer to A.3 in the appendix for the definition of group-strategyproofness, and
for proof of this statement.
6 Deterministic Mechanisms
6.1 Lower Bound
In the continuous model it is well known that choosing the location of the median agent is both
truthful and optimal [23]. The following lemma shows that this does not hold in our candidate
model.
Lemma 19. No deterministic truthful mechanism (location, ranking or voting) can achieve an
approximation ratio strictly below 3 for the social cost, even when the metric space is <.
Proof. Let there be 2 candidates such that y1 = −1 and y2 = 1. According to the sixth claim in
Theorem 1 (Claim 29), any truthful location mechanism M is necessarily reducible to a voting
mechanism. Let x = (−1, ), x′ = (−, 1) be two location profiles, and let B be the border
between them. Clearly, both profiles correspond with the same votes (x1, x
′
1 ∈ V1 \ B and
x2, x
′
2 ∈ V2 \B), therefore their outcome will be identical.
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If M(x) = M(x′) = C1, then the approximation ratio for M given x is SC(M,x)SC(OPT,x) =
3−
1+ .
If M(x) = M(x′) = C2 then the approximation ratio for M given x′ is SC(M,x
′)
SC(OPT,x′) =
3−
1+ .
In either case, the approximation ratio tends to 3 as  tends to 0.
A result by Anshelevich et al. (Theorem 3 in [3]) uses a similar method to show the worst
case for ranking mechanisms with non-strategic agents is 3 (the proof in that paper was done
for a general metric space, but it can also be applied to <). Lemma 19 makes use of Claim 29
to prove that the same lower bound of 3 also applies even to location mechanisms, under the
condition that the mechanism must be truthful (when the agents are strategic).
6.2 Upper Bound
As noted previously, in the continuous model on <, the mechanism which locates the facility
on the report of the median agent is truthful and results in the optimal social cost. We define
the median mechanism in the context of candidate constraints, and assess its social cost.
Definition 20 (Median mechanism). Given a vote profile a, let pi be a permutation such that
y
(
api(1)
) ≤ . . . ≤ y (api(n)). Median is a voting mechanism which chooses the median vote, that
is api(dn/2e).
Lemma 21. Median is a truthful mechanism which results in a 3 approximation of the optimal
social cost on <.
The proof is given in the appendix A.4.
7 Open Problems
As explained in the introduction, we believe that there are many possible manifestations of
this setting, though it has barely been investigated, so there is plenty of room for future work.
Clearly, there are gaps in some of the bounds in the paper which are currently open. Addi-
tionally, one can investigate the questions from the facility location literature in this setting,
e.g., electing a committee of several candidates, addressing the problem of “obnoxious facility
location” in which the agents wish to elect the candidate farthest away from them, or proving
additional bounds for group strategyproofness.
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A Appendix
A.1 Missing Proofs from Section 3
In this part we aim to define reducibility of some mechanism type (voting, ranking or location)
to some other mechanism type. The definition of the reduction requires a couple of additional
definitions, which we will express formally as well as explain intuitively.
Intuitively, we say that a mechanism type Aˆ is of finer granularity than mechanism type
Bˆ, if the information of a true action in Aˆ can determine a true action in Bˆ. For instance, a
location determines a ranking (or several rankings, if a point is on a border), therefore location
mechanisms are of finer granularity than ranking mechanisms. Similarly, ranking mechanisms
are of finer granularity than voting mechanisms, and location mechanisms are also of finer
granularity than voting mechanisms. However, ranking mechanisms are not of finer granularity
than location mechanisms, since a ranking does not determine a location. That is, for a ranking
pi1 there exist different locations x1, x2 whose true ranking is pi1. Formally, a mechanism type
Aˆ : A → C is of finer granularity than mechanism type Bˆ : B → C if for any point x and any
a ∈ A there exists some b ∈ B such that: if a is a true action of an agent at point x under Aˆ,
then b is a true action of point x under Bˆ. In this case we denote Aˆ  Bˆ.
We now utilize this notion of granularity to define consistent functions. Intuitively, we would
like to define functions which map between inputs of different mechanism types in a “consistent”
manner. For instance, when mapping from rankings (the input to ranking mechanisms) to votes
(candidates, that is - the input to voting mechanisms), we search for functions which map each
ranking to the top candidate in that ranking. When mapping from votes to rankings, we seek
functions which map a vote for a candidate to some ranking in which this candidate is first.
Formally, given mechanism types Aˆ : A → C and Bˆ : B → C such that Aˆ  Bˆ, a function
f : A → B is called consistent if for any point x and for any a ∈ A, then if a is a true action
under Aˆ, then f(a) is a true action under Bˆ. Notice that in these cases a function f is unique
(except for the cases in which Aˆ is a location mechanism and x is a point on a border). If
Bˆ  Aˆ then we define f : A→ B to be consistent if for any point x, if f(a) is a true action for
x under Bˆ then a is a true action for x under Aˆ. In these cases the function f is not unique
(for example, there are several rankings in which a specific candidate is first).
The function f may be randomized, as long as it is a randomization over deterministic
consistent functions. For example, a consistent function f mapping locations (the input of
location mechanisms) to candidates (the inputs of voting mechanisms) must map every point
which is not on a border to their favorite candidate. On the other hand, for a point x on some
border, f may randomize the output of x arbitrarily over the set of favorite candidates of x.
A candidate selection mechanism M (whether location, ranking or voting) is said to be
reducible to a candidate selection mechanism M ′ (location, ranking, or voting) if there exists a
consistent function f mapping every action profile a, which is an input of M , to some action
profile f(a) = a′ which is the input of M ′, such that the distribution over the candidates, M(a),
is identical to the distribution over candidates M ′(a′) (see Figure 11).
For example, every voting mechanism, M , is reducible to some ranking mechanism M ′. The
reduction is as follows: Let f be the consistent function describes previously – it receives a
vector of n candidates, and outputs a vector of n rankings (permutations), where for each i, the
i’th candidate is ranked first in the i’th ranking. We choose a ranking mechanism M ′ which
ignores all entries in the rankings but the first, and simulates the voting mechanism M on the
top entries of the rankings. By definition, M is reducible to M ′. Moreover, note that M was an
arbitrary voting mechanism, so we conclude that indeed every voting mechanism is reducible
to some ranking mechanism. This logic further shows that for mechanism types Aˆ, Bˆ such that
Bˆ  Aˆ, any mechanism M of type Aˆ is reducible to some mechanism M ′ of type Bˆ.
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Figure 11: A graphic sketch of a mechanism M which is reducible to a mechanism M ′.
As written in Section 3, two sets of mechanisms, S1 and S2, are said to be equivalent if every
M1 ∈ S1 is reducible to some M2 ∈ S2, and every M2 ∈ S2 is reducible to some M1 ∈ S1. A set
of mechanisms S1 is said to be strictly contained in a set of mechanisms S2 if every mechanism
M1 ∈ S1 is reducible to some mechanism M2 ∈ S2, yet not every mechanism M2 ∈ S2 is
reducible to some mechanism M1 ∈ S1. This is a slight abuse of terminology since the sets S1
and S2 may be disjoint, as their input space may be different.
The following lemma will be of use in the main theorem of this section.
Lemma 22. In any metric space, let Aˆ, Bˆ be mechanism types such that Bˆ  Aˆ. Let S1, S2 be
the sets of truthful mechanisms of type Aˆ, Bˆ respectively. Then for any M1 ∈ S1 there exists
some M2 ∈ S2 such that M1 is reducible to M2.
Proof. By the fact that Bˆ is of finer granularity than Aˆ and by the definition of the consistent
function f , it is eminent that M1 is reducible to some M2 of type Bˆ since M2 can completely
disregard any input beyond any information in Aˆ and simulate M1 (as explained previously
for the example in which a ranking mechanism disregards any candidate except for the top
candidate in each ranking).
In order to complete the proof, it is left to show that there exists such a mechanism M2 which
is truthful. Since the only reports which change the outcome of M2 are consistent with reports
which would change the outcome of M1, then if M2 weren’t truthful this would contradict the
truthfulness of M1.
Observation 23. Notice that this reasoning also holds for truthful in expectation mechanisms
(that is if S1, S2 are defined as the sets of truthful in expectation mechanisms of types Aˆ, Bˆ).
We move on to proving the main theorem of this section:
Proof. of Theorem 1: The proof of each claim is given separately:
Claim 24. The class of truthful deterministic ranking mechanisms strictly contains the class
of truthful deterministic voting mechanisms.
Proof. According to Lemma 22 any truthful voting mechanism is reducible to some truthful
ranking mechanism. We exhibit a deterministic truthful ranking mechanism M which is not
reducible to any voting mechanism (even on <). We show this by exhibiting an example in which
M acts differently under two ranking profiles which are mapped by any consistent function to
the same voting zone.
Let there be 3 candidates, and denote the ranking zones R1,R2,R3,R4, which match the
permutations over candidates pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4 respectively (see Figure 12). M acts as follows: If
a1 ∈ pi1 ∪ pi2 and a2 ∈ pi1 ∪ pi2, then choose C1. Otherwise, choose C3.
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C1 C2 C3b1,2 b1,3 b2,3
R1 R2 R3 R4
x1 x2
Figure 12: The 4 ranking zones. Every border bi,j is the midpoint between candidates Ci, Cj .
The points x1, x2 have different rankings – the ranking of x1 is pi2 = C2  C1  C3 whereas the
ranking of x2 is pi3 = C2  C3  C1. However, both strictly prefer C2 over any other candidate,
therefore for any consistent function f : f(pi2) = f(pi3) = C2.
Figure 13: A graphic sketch of the reductions in the proof of Claim 25.
M is truthful — if C1 is chosen, then both agents prefer it over C3 and have no incentive to
misreport. If C3 is chosen, then at least one of the agents is in zones R3 or R4 - this agent has
no incentive to misreport since she prefers C3 over C1. The other agent has no influence over
the outcome, therefore also has no incentive to misreport.
M is not reducible to any voting mechanism — any consistent function f must map both
pi2 and pi3 to C2. However, whilst M acts differently under inputs (pi1, pi2) and (pi1, pi3), then
if there were a reduction, then both of these would have been mapped to the same location
M ′(C1, C2) in contradiction.
Claim 25. The set of truthful deterministic location mechanisms is equivalent to the set of
truthful deterministic ranking mechanisms.
Proof. According to Lemma 22, every truthful deterministic ranking mechanism is reducible to
some truthful deterministic location mechanism. It is left to show that every truthful determin-
istic location mechanism M in <d is reducible to a truthful deterministic ranking mechanism
M ′.
The proof consists of several parts. For an arbitrary location profile x and an arbitrary
truthful deterministic mechanism M , we define a location profile x′ which has no locations on
borders, and show that it necessarily holds that M(x) = M(x′). We then define a different
location profile x′′ and show the same: M(x) = M(x′′). The profile x′′ is special in the sense
that it is uniquely defined by some ranking profile pi. Finally, we show that given some input
pi = fM (x) a consistent function fM (a function which depends on M , and will be defined later),
there exists a ranking mechanism M ′ which simulates M on x′′ (see Figure 13). The result is
a constructive reduction which maintains the same output as the original location mechanism
M(x), as needed.
24
Let M be an arbitrary truthful deterministic location mechanism, and let x be an arbitrary
location profile. Let M(x) = Cj for some candidate Cj located at yj . Denote the ranking borders
as B.
Informally, we define x′ as a location profile which moves all agents in x which are on a
border, an infinitesimal distance towards the chosen candidate Cj . The resulting profile x′ has
no agents on borders. We now define this formally: let  be some small positive number. For
all i such that xi ∈ B, let ~i be a vector of size  in direction yj − xi 4. For any i such that
xi /∈ B, let |~i| = 0. Let x′ = (x1 + 1, . . . xn + n). We choose an  sufficiently small such that
for each i, x′i remains in the ranking zone of xi.
We now show that M(x) = M(x′) by moving agents from x to x′ one by one, and showing
that if any of these transitions were to change the chosen candidate, this would lead to a
violation of truthfulness of M . Let:
w0 = (x1, . . . , xn) = x
w1 = (x
′
1, x2, . . . , xn)
. . .
wi = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
i, xi+1, . . . , xn)
. . .
wn = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n) = x
′
Assume towards a contradiction that M(w0) 6= M(wn). Let i be the minimal index such that
M(wi−1) 6= M(wi). It is known that M(wi−1) = M(x) = Cj . Denote M(wi) = Cl, where Cl is
located at point yl. There are two options:
• If |yl − xi| < |yj − xi|, then in profile wi−1, xi has an incentive to misreport to x′i.
• If |yl − xi| ≥ |yj − xi|, then |yj − x′i| = |yj − xi| −  < |x′i − yl|. Therefore in profile wi, x′i
has an incentive to misreport to xi.
Hence, M(x) = M(x′) as needed.
Intuitively, we create the location profile x′′ by moving all agents in x′ to some specific point
within their ranking zone. Since x′ contained no agents on borders, each agent in x′ is located
in exactly one ranking zone, hence x′′ is well defined. We now define this formally: For any
ranking zone Ri such that Ri \B 6= ∅, let xˆi be some point in Ri \B (for instance, the centroid
of the ranking zone Ri)5. Denote the ranking zone which contains x′i as Rj . For all i ∈ N , let
x′′i = xˆj . Let x
′′ = (x′′1, . . . , x′′n).
We now show that M(x′) = M(x′′) in a similar fashion as we showed that M(x) = M(x′)
previously. Let:
h0 = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n) = x
′
h1 = (x
′′
1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n)
. . .
hi = (x
′′
1, . . . , x
′′
i , x
′
i+1, . . . , x
′
n)
. . .
hn = (x
′′
1, . . . , x
′′
n) = x
′′
4If xi = yj then the direction of ~i can be set arbitrarily.
5We can safely disregard ranking zones which do not have any points which are not on a border, as no point
in x′ will be in such a zone, since x′ does not contain any points on borders.
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Assume towards a contradiction that M(h0) 6= M(hn). Let i be the minimal index such that
M(hi−1) 6= M(hi). Denote M(hi) = Cm such that Cm is located at ym. Since x′i, x′′i are in the
same ranking zone and not on a border, there are two options:
• If |ym − x′i| < |yj − x′i|, then in profile hi−1, x′i has an incentive to misreport to x′′i .
• If |ym − x′i| > |yj − x′i|, then it also holds that |ym − x′′i | > |yj − x′′i |, and in profile hi, x′′i
has an incentive to misreport to x′i.
Therefore, M(x′) = M(x′′)⇒M(x) = M(x′′).
It is left to show that it is possible to perform the “nested reductions” as shown in Figure
13. Let fM be the consistent function which breaks ties just like M does. That is, fM simulates
M on input x, finds the candidate Cj and breaks ties in favor of rankings closer to Cj . The
output of fM is a ranking profile denoted by pi. Given pi, there exists some M
′ that simulates M
on x′′6 — let f ′ be a consistent function which maps every ranking pii (consistent with ranking
zone Ri) to the point xˆi. Therefore, such a reduction exists, and the output is M(x′′) = M(x).
Claim 26. The set of truthful in expectation ranking mechanisms strictly contains the set of
truthful in expectation voting mechanisms.
Proof. As shown in Observation 23, any truthful in expectation voting mechanism is reducible
to some truthful in expectation ranking mechanism. The proof of Claim 24 exhibits a truthful
in expectation ranking mechanism which is not reducible to any voting mechanism.
Claim 27. The set of truthful in expectation randomized location mechanisms strictly contains
the set of truthful in expectation randomized ranking mechanisms.
Proof. As shown in Observation 23, any truthful in expectation ranking mechanism is reducible
to some truthful in expectation location mechanism.
We will show a truthful in expectation location mechanism M which is not reducible to any
ranking mechanism: Let there be 3 candidates at points y1 = 0, y2 = 3, y3 = 4. M acts as
follows:
Choose an agent i uniformly at random. Choose the candidates with the following proba-
bilities:
M(a) =
{
C1 = 1/3, C2 = 1/3, C3 = 1/3 if ai ≤ 1
C1 = 1/4, C2 = 1/2, C3 = 1/4 otherwise.
M is not reducible to any ranking mechanism — any consistent function f must map both
points x1 = 0.75 and x2 = 1.25 to pi1 = C1  C2  C3. However, mechanism M treats these two
inputs differently.
It is left to show that M is truthful in expectation. We do so by assessing all possibilities
of misreports. Obviously, the mechanism is not affected by any agents except the one who was
chosen. Since there are only two possible outcomes, it is sufficient to compare truthful reports
ai with misreports a
′
i such that a
′
i changes the outcome. Let a = (ai, a−i) and a
′ = (a′i, a−i).
6To avoid a circular definition, one can think of M ′ simulating a location mechanism which acts precisely like
M does.
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• If xi ≤ 0 it holds that
costxi (M,a) =
1
3
[−xi + (3− xi) + (4− xi)] = −xi + 7/3
costxi
(
M,a′
)
=
1
4
[−xi + (4− xi)] + 1
2
(3− xi) = −xi + 5/2.
Therefore: costxi (M,a) ≤ costxi (M,a′).
• If 0 < xi < 3 it holds that
– If the outcome is C1 = 1/3, C2 = 1/3, C3 = 1/3, the cost of agent i is:
1
3
[xi + (3− xi) + (4− xi)] = −xi/3 + 7/3.
– If the result is C1 = 1/4, C2 = 1/2, C3 = 1/4 the cost of agent i is:
1
4
(xi + 4− xi) + 1
2
(3− xi) = −xi/2 + 5/2.
It holds that −xi/3 + 7/3 ≥ −xi/2 + 5/2 ⇔ xi ≥ 1. Therefore the first outcome
is preferable to agents for which 0 < xi ≤ 1 and the second is better for agents for
which 1 < xi < 3, and the mechanism is truthful in expectation in this interval.
• If 3 ≤ xi < 4 it holds that
costxi (M,a) =
1
4
(xi + 4− xi) + 1
2
(xi − 3) = xi/2− 1/2
costxi
(
M,a′
)
=
1
3
[xi + (xi − 3) + (4− xi)] = xi/3 + 1/3.
Therefore: costxi (M,a) ≤ costxi (M,a′) ⇔ xi ≤ 5, therefore agent i cannot benefit from
misreporting.
• If xi ≥ 4 it holds that
costxi (M,a) =
1
4
(xi + xi − 4) + 1
2
(xi − 3) = xi − 5/2
costxi
(
M,a′
)
=
1
3
[xi + (xi − 3) + (xi − 4)] = xi − 7/3.
Therefore: costxi (M,a) ≤ costxi (M,a′).
Claim 28. The set of truthful in expectation randomized voting mechanisms strictly contains
the set of universally truthful randomized voting mechanisms.
Proof. Any universally truthful voting mechanism is reducible to a truthful in expectation voting
mechanism using the identity function f (which is consistent).
We exhibit a truthful in expectation (TIE) voting mechanism M which is not reducible to
any universally truthful mechanism. Let there be 2 candidates. M chooses an agent i uniformly
at random, and chooses ai with probability 0.9 and the other candidate C \ ai with probability
0.1.
M is truthful in expectation since for any agent j, if they are chosen, they are better
off receiving their favorite candidate with probability 0.9 than with probability 0.1. M is
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not universally truthful, since for each agent i there exist cases in which reporting truthfully
would lead to choosing their less favorite candidate, while there exist cases in which reporting
non-truthfully would lead to choosing the favorite candidate. Clearly, no composition with a
consistent function f can transform M to a universally truthful mechanism (for instance, let
ai = Cj for some j. From consistency, f(ai) = Cj , so f does not change the outcome at all).
Claim 29. When there are two candidates, the set of truthful in expectation randomized location
mechanisms is equivalent to the set of truthful in expectation randomized voting mechanisms.
Proof. As shown in Observation 23, any truthful in expectation voting mechanism is reducible
to some truthful in expectation location mechanism. This also holds for voting mechanisms for
two candidates. We now show that any truthful in expectation location mechanism with two
candidates is reducible to some truthful in expectation voting mechanism. The proof follows
similar lines as the proof of Claim 25.
Let x be an arbitrary location profile, let M be an arbitrary truthful in expectation location
mechanism, and let B be the border between C1 and C2. Define x′ as the location profile which
moves all agents which are not on borders to their favorite candidate, that is:
x′i =

y1 if xi ∈ V1 \B
y2 if xi ∈ V2 \B
xi if xi ∈ B
We now show that M(x) = M(x′) by using a hybrid argument. Define:
w0 = (x1, . . . , xn) = x
w1 = (x
′
1, x2, . . . , xn)
. . .
wi = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
i, xi+1, . . . , xn)
. . .
wn = (x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n) = x
′
Assume towards a contradiction that M(w0) 6= M(wn). Then there exists some index j
such that Pr [M(wj) = C1] 6= Pr [M(wj−1) = C1]. If this is the case then necessarily xj /∈ B
since that would imply that wj−1 and wj are precisely the same profile. Assume without loss
of generality that Pr [M(wj) = C1] > Pr [M(wj−1) = C1]. There are 2 options:
• If xj , x′j ∈ V1, then under location profile wj , agent j has an incentive to misreport to x′j .
• If xj , x′j ∈ V2, then under location profile wj−1, agent j has an incentive to misreport to
xj .
Therefore is necessarily holds that M(x) = M(x′).
We now use x′ to show the reduction: Let f be a function which maps voting profiles to
location profiles, by mapping each vote to candidate Ci to location yi. This function is clearly
consistent. Let M ′ be a voting mechanism which receives a voting profile, translates it to a
location mechanism using the consistent function f , and then simulates M on the output of f
(see Figure 14).
For cases in which no agent is on the border, then the function f ′ mapping location profiles
to voting profiles is uniquely defined, and it holds that M(x) = M ′(f ′(x)) = M(f(f ′(x))). It is
left to show that in cases of agents on borders, there exists some consistent function f ′ which
breaks ties in the same manner that M does.
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Figure 14: A graphic sketch of the reductions in the proof of Claim 29.
Let x′(1) be a location profile with n1 agents at y1, n2 agents somewhere on the border B
and n3 agents at y2. In short, we note x
′(1) = (n1, n2, n3). Recognize that x′(1) is a general
location profile, after moving agents to their favorite candidates. Using these amounts, define
the following two location profiles:
• Let x′(2) be the profile in which there are n1 + n2 agents at y1 and n3 agents at y2 (that
is x′(2) = (n1 + n2, 0, n3)).
• Let x′(3) be the profile in which there are n1 agents at y1 and n2 + n3 agents at y2 (that
is x′(3) = (n1, 0, n2 + n3)).
Let p1 = Pr[M(x
′(1)) = C1], and similarly: p2 = Pr[M(x′(2)) = C1] and p3 = Pr[M(x′(3)) = C1].
Under these definitions, we show that: p3 ≤ p1 ≤ p2:
• p1 ≤ p2: Start with the profile x′(1), and move agents on the border one by one to y1.
If in each step the probability of choosing C1 does not decrease then p1 ≤ p2 as needed.
Otherwise, there exists a profile xˆ = (ni, nj , n3) for which the probability of choosing C1
is smaller than in the profile with xˆ′ = (ni − 1, nj + 1, n3). If this were the case, then
the agents on y1 in profile xˆ would benefit from misreporting to the point on a border, in
contradiction to truthfulness.
• p3 ≤ p1 is proved in the exact symmetrical manner, by moving agents from B to y2 one
by one.
By definition, a consistent function can map agents on borders to either of the two candi-
dates, and can also choose any probabilities over the two agents. Therefore, for any 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
there exists a consistent function which takes n agents on the border and maps all of them to
C1 with probability q and maps all of them to C2 with probability 1− q. For any p1, we choose
the consistent function f ′ which uses a q such that p2 · q+ p3 · (1− q) = p1. Under this function
f ′, the reduction does not change the outcome of the mechanism, as needed.
A.2 Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof. of Lemma 2: Let x be some location profile. Let a be a voting profile, where a is in
ascending order, that is: y(a1) ≤ y(a2) ≤ . . . ≤ y(an). Let a′i be a misreport of some agent i,
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aj−1
aj−1
a′j−1
aj
aj
a′j
a′i
a′j+1
aj+1
aj+1
a′j+2
ai−1
ai−1
a′i
ai ai+1
y(ai+1)
y(a′i+1)
a:
a′:
Figure 15: Misreporting in a WPV: a is shown in the first line, the misreport in the second line,
and the misreport after renaming the reports in ascending order in the third line.
and without loss of generality assume y(a′i) < y(ai). Denote the report directly to the left of a
′
i
as aj , that is: y(aj) ≤ y(a′i) ≤ y(aj+1) . Let a′ be the reports (a′i, a−i) in ascending order (see
Figure 15).
costxi(M,a)− costxi(M,a′) =
n∑
k=1
pk|y(ak)− xi| −
n∑
k=1
pk|y(a′k)− xi|
=
i∑
k=j+1
pk[|y(ak)− xi| − |y(a′k)− xi|]
The last equality holds since for any k such that k ≤ j or k > i: y(ak) = y(a′k).
For any k such that: j < k ≤ i: |y(a′k) ≤ y(ak)|. In this case:
• If xi ≥ y(ak): |y(a′k)− xi| ≥ |y(ak)− xi| from the triangle inequality.
• If xi < y(ak): Then y(ak) = y(ai) and ai is the true action of xi, i.e., there is no candidate
closer to xi than it.
Therefore, for all k: |y(ak)−xi| ≤ |y(a′k)−xi|. Hence the agent cannot benefit from misreporting
regardless of the results of the random bits, so M is universally truthful.
Proof. of Lemma 9: For any candidate j denote pj = Pr[M(a) = yj ] and p
′
j = Pr[M(a
′) = yj ].
Define ∆j as the difference in the cost of candidate j under profile x and her cost under x
′,
that is: ∆j =
∑n
i=1 |yj −xi|−
∑n
i=1 |yj −x′i|. Since x′ was defined by moving all agents towards
Copt, then: ∀j : ∆opt ≥ ∆j . As noted previously, this means that Copt remains the optimal
candidate under a′. According to Lemma 30, the worst-case ratio occurs when all agents on
borders vote outwards (farther from yopt), so the probabilities under a
′ remain the same as
under a: ∀j : pj = p′j .
We now assess the approximation ratio under profile x′:
SC(OPT,x′) =
∑
i
|yopt − x′i| = SC(OPT,x)−∆opt
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The cost of the spike mechanism on x′ is:
SC(M,x′) = p′j ·
[∑
i
|yj − x′i|
]
= pj ·
[(∑
i
|yj − xi|
)
−∆j
]
≥ pj ·
[(∑
i
|yj − xi|
)
−∆opt
]
= SC(M,x)−∆opt
Therefore, the new approximation ratio is:
SC(M,x′)
SC(OPT,x′)
≥ SC(M,x
′)−∆opt
SC(OPT,x′)−∆opt ≥
SC(M,x)
SC(OPT,x)
Proof. of Lemma 10: We use the same notation as in Figures 8b and 8c where there are ni
agents at point xˆi.
Let ∆ = SC(OPT,x) − SC(OPT,x′) = n1 · (xˆ2 − xˆ1) > 0. It is sufficient to show that
SC(S,x,a)− SC(S,x′,a) ≤ 2∆ since that would imply:
SC(S,x,a)
SC(OPT,x)
≤ SC(S,x
′,a) + 2∆
SC(OPT,x′) + ∆
≤ 2 · SC(OPT,x
′)) + 2∆
SC(OPT,x′) + ∆
= 2
Denote the probabilities as follows: pi = Pr[S(a) = yi], p
′
i = Pr[S(a
′) = yi]. Similarly, the
costs of the candidates are denoted: ci = SC(Ci,x) =
∑n
j=1 |xj − yi| and c′i = SC(Ci,x′) =∑n
j=1 |x′j − yi|. The probabilities and costs under profile x′ are:
p′i =

0 if i = 1
p1 + p2 if i = 2
pi if i ≥ 3
Denote δ = n1 (|xˆ2 − y2| − |y2 − xˆ1|), so the costs are:
c′i =
{
c2 + n1 (|x2 − y2| − |y2 − x1|) = c2 + δ if i = 2
ci −∆ if i ≥ 3
Therefore, the difference in the cost is:
SC(S,x)− SC(S,x′) =
∑
i
(
pici − p′ic′i
)
= p1c1 + p2c2 − (p1 + p2) (c2 + δ) +
∑
i≥3
pi [ci − (ci −∆)]
= p1 (c1 − c2 − δ)− p2 · δ +
∑
i≥3
pi∆
= p1 (c1 − c2 − δ)− p2 · δ + (1− p1 − p2) ∆
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Due to the triangle inequality:
|xˆ2 − y2| ≤ |xˆ2 − xˆ1|+ |xˆ1 − y2|
⇔ δ = n1 (|xˆ2 − y2| − |xˆ1 − y2|) ≤ n1|xˆ2 − xˆ1| = |∆|
Therefore:
p1 (c1 − c2 − δ)− p2 · δ + (1− p1 − p2) ∆
≤ p1 (c1 − c2 + ∆) + p2 ·∆ + (1− p1 − p2) ∆
= p1 (c1 − c2) + ∆
Also c1 − c2 = (n− n1)|y2 − y1|, so together:
SC(S,x)− SC(S,x′) ≤ p1 [(n− n1)|y2 − y1|] + ∆
To conclude the proof it is left to show that p1 [(n− n1)|y2 − y1|] ≤ ∆ = |xˆ2 − xˆ1|n1. Since
|y2−y1|
2 = |y2 − xˆ1| < |xˆ2 − xˆ1|, it is sufficient to show that: p1(n − n1) ≤ n12 . S is a spike
mechanism, so p1 is:
• If n1 ≤ n/2 then: p1 = n12(n−n1) ⇒ p1(n− n1) =
n1
2(n−n1)(n− n1) = n1/2.
• If n1 > n/2 then: p1 = 1.5− n2n1 = 3n1−n2n1 , so:
p1(n− n1) = 3n1 − n
2n1
(n− n1) = −n
2 − 3n21 + 4nn1
2n1
=
−n2 − 4n21 + 4nn1
2n1
+
n21
2n1
=
−(n− 2n1)2
2n1
+
n1
2
≤ n1
2
.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
Proof. of Lemma 11: We use the notations of the location of the left, center and right candidates
in the following manner yL = yopt−1, yC = yopt, yR = yopt+1, and the amount of agents in
bL, yC , bC as L,C,R respectively (see Figure 8d). Denote the probabilities of choosing the
candidates as pL = Pr(S(x) = yL), pC = Pr(S(x) = yC), pR = Pr(S(x) = yR). Also, without
loss of generality, the distances can be scaled such that bC − yC = 1. Define: β = yC − bL.
The costs of the different candidates are:
SC(CL,x) = β · (L+ 2C + 2R) +R
SC(CC ,x) = L · β +R = SC(OPT,x)
SC(CR,x) = Lβ + (2L+ 2C +R)
Due to the definition of the spike mechanism, the proof is broken into two parts:
1. The median agent is on yC
2. The median agent is on bL
Note that the last option (in which the median agent is on bC) is identical to the second case
due to symmetry, therefore proving for these two cases is sufficient.
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In the first case, the median agent is at the center, therefore L < C + R and R < L + C,
and from the definition of the spike mechanism:
pL =
L
2(C +R)
pR =
R
2(C + L)
pC = 1− pL − pR = 1− L
2(C +R)
− R
2(C + L)
Therefore the ratio is:
SC(M,x)
SC(OPT,x)
=
pLSC(CL,x) + pCSC(CC ,x) + pRSC(CR,x)
SC(CC ,x)
=
pLSC(CL,x) + pRSC(CR,x)
SC(CC ,x) + pC
=
1
Lβ +R
[
L(β(L+ 2C + 2R) +R)
2(C +R)
+
R(Lβ + (2L+ 2C +R))
2(L+ C)
]
+
(
1− L
2(C +R)
− R
2(L+ C)
)
= 1 +
L(Lβ + 2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
2(C +R)(Lβ +R)
− L(Lβ +R)
2(C +R)(Lβ +R)
+
R(Lβ + 2L+ 2C +R)
2(L+ C)(Lβ +R)
− R(Lβ +R)
2(L+ C)(Lβ +R)
= 1 +
L(2Cβ + 2Rβ)
2(C +R)(Lβ +R)
+
R(2L+ 2C)
2(L+ C)(Lβ +R)
= 1 +
Lβ
Lβ +R
+
R
Lβ +R
= 2
Therefore the ratio cannot exceed 2 in the first case.
In the second case the median agent is at bL and the probabilities are:
pL = 1.5− L+ C +R
2L
= 1− C +R
2L
pR =
R
2(C + L)
pC = 1− pL − pR = 1−
(
1− C +R
2L
)
− R
2(C + L)
=
C +R
2L
− R
2(C + L)
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Therefore the approximation ratio is:
SC(M,x)
SC(OPT,x)
=
pLSC(CL,x) + pRSC(CR,x)
SC(CC ,x) + pC
=
1
Lβ +R
[(
1− C +R
2L
)
(Lβ + 2Cβ + 2Rβ +R) +
R
2(L+ C)
(Lβ + 2L+ 2C +R)
]
+
C +R
2L
− R
2(C + L)
=
1
Lβ +R
[
Lβ +R+ 2Cβ + 2Rβ − (C +R)(Lβ + 2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
2L
+
R(2L+ 2C + Lβ +R)
2(L+ C)
]
+
C +R
2L
− R
2(C + L)
= 1 +
1
Lβ +R
[
2β(C +R)− (C +R)Lβ
2L
− (C +R)(2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
2L
+R+
R(Lβ +R)
2(L+ C)
]
+
C +R
2L
− R
2(C + L)
= 1 +
1
Lβ +R
[
3β(C +R)
2
− (C +R)(2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
2L
+R
]
+
R
2(L+ C)
+
C +R
2L
− R
2(C + L)
= 1 +
3β(C +R) + 2R
2(Lβ +R)
− (C +R)(2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
(Lβ +R)2L
+
LR
2L(L+ C)
+
C +R
2L
− R
2(C + L)
= 1 +
3β(C +R) + 2R
2(Lβ +R)
− (C +R)(2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
2L(Lβ +R)
+
(C +R)
2L
Now, in order to show this is a 2 approximation:
1 +
3β(C +R) + 2R
2(Lβ +R)
− (C +R)(2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
2L(Lβ +R)
+
(C +R)
2L
≤ 2
⇔ 3β(C +R) + 2R
2(Lβ +R)
− (C +R)(2Cβ + 2Rβ +R)
2L(Lβ +R)
+
(C +R)(Lβ +R)
2L(Lβ +R)
≤ 1
And by multiplying both sides by the common denominator 2L(Lβ +R):
L[3β(C +R) + 2R] + (C +R)(−2Cβ − 2Rβ −R+ Lβ +R) ≤ 2L(Lβ +R)
⇔ L[3β(C +R) + 2R] + (C +R)(Lβ − 2Cβ − 2Rβ) ≤ 2L(Lβ +R)
⇔ L[3β(C +R)] + β(C +R)(L− 2C − 2R) ≤ 2L · Lβ
Since β is always positive, it is possible to divide both sides by β:
L[3(C +R)] + (C +R)(L− 2C − 2R) ≤ 2L2
⇔ 3LC + 3LR+ LC − 2C2 − 2CR+ LR− 2CR− 2R2 ≤ 2L2
⇔ 0 ≤ 2L2 + 2C2 + 2R2 − 4LC − 4LR+ 4CR
⇔ 0 ≤ L2 + C2 +R2 − 2LC − 2LR+ 2CR
⇔ 0 ≤ (L− C −R)2
This term is indeed always non-negative, so this concludes the proof.
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Lemma 30. Let x be an arbitrary location profile, and let agent i be on a border bj such that
yj < xi = bj < yj+1 ≤ yopt.
Let a1 = (ai = Cj ,a−i), let a2 = (ai = Cj+1,a−i), and let M be some WPV mechanism.
Then SC(M,x,a1) ≥ SC(M,x,a2).
Proof. Let pi = Pr[M(a1) = Ci] and qi = Pr[M(a2) = Ci]. According to the definition of WPV
mechanisms, the change of vote only affects the probabilities of candidates Cj and Cj+1, that is:
∀k 6= j, j + 1: pk = qk. Denote: pj = qj + α and pj+1 + α = qj+1 for some α > 0. Therefore:
SC(M,x,a1)− SC(M,x,a2) =
∑
k
pk · SC(Ck,x)−
∑
k
qk · SC(Ck,x)
= α [SC(Cj ,x)− SC(Cj+1,x)]
Therefore it is sufficient to show that SC(Cj ,x) ≥ SC(Cj+1,x). We define the cost function
for any point on the line: f(x) =
∑
k |x− xk|. By definition, for any candidate Cl: SC(Cl,x) =
f(yl).
Clearly, f(x) is single-peaked, with a peak at the median xdn/2e, since moving in any direction
away from the median only increases the distance to at least half of the agents.
We check the different cases:
• If yopt ≤ xdn/2e: Then yj < yj+1 ≤ yopt ≤ xdn/2e ⇐ f(yj) ≥ f(yj+1).
• If yopt > xdn/2e:
– If yj+1 = yopt: Then the proof is concluded by definition of optimality.
– If yj+1 < yopt then by definition of optimality: yj < yj+1 < xdn/2e < yopt. Therefore:
f(yj) ≥ f(yj+1).
The proof also holds for the symmetrical case in which yopt ≤ yj < bj = xi < yj+1.
A.3 Missing Proofs from Section 5
Proof. of Lemma 12: Proof via contradiction. Assume costxl(M, (al = pij , a−l)) = costxl(M, (al =
pii, a−l)) + δ for some δ > 0. Let there be an agent k located in ranking zone Rj such that
|xk − xl| =  < δ2 .
Then agent k has an incentive to misreport:
costxk(M, (ak = pij , a−k)) ≥ costxl(M, (ak = pij , a−k))− 
= costxl(M, (ak = pii, a−k)) + δ − 
> costxl(M, (ak = pii, a−k)) + 
≥ costxk(M, (ak = pii, a−k))
The transitions in the first and last rows are due to the triangle inequality (for any location
the mechanism may choose), the second row holds by the assumption, and the third row holds
since  < δ2 .
Agent k has an incentive to misreport, contradicting the assumption and completing the
proof.
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Proof. of Lemma 17: We prove the lower bounds for the case of two agents and two candidates.
Let y1 = −1, y2 = 1. Let a = (a1, a2) be the ranking profile in which the two agents prefer
different candidates, that is: a1 = C1  C2, a2 = C2  C1.
Examine the following two location profiles x,x′, (in both cases for which a is a truthful
voting profile): x = (−1, ), x′ = (−, 1).
We show that any decision of the mechanism makes will cause an approximation ratio of 2
either in x or in x′.
It is easy to see that:
SC(C1,x) = 1 +  = SC(OPT,x)
SC(C2,x) = 3− 
SC(C1,x′) = 3− 
SC(C2,x′) = 1 +  = SC(OPT,x′)
Denote p = Pr[M(a) = C1]. Therefore:
SC(M,x) = p(1 + ) + (1− p)(3− )
SC(M,x′) = p(3− ) + (1− p)(1 + )
The approximation ratio is therefore at least:
min
0≤p≤1
{
max
{
SC(M,x)
SC(OPT,x)
,
SC(M,x′)
SC(OPT,x′)
}}
=
min
0≤p≤1
{
max
{
p(1 + ) + (1− p)(3− )
1 + 
,
(1− p)(1 + ) + p(3− )
1 + 
}}
=
min
0≤p≤1
{max {1 + 2p− p, 3− 2p+ 2p− }}
The optimal value is reached at p = 0.5, and it is 2− 2 , which tends to 2 as  tends to 0.
Proof. of Lemma 18 (Random Dictator): Random dictator (RD) is a WPV mechanism and so
it is universally truthful according to Lemma 2.
We start by showing that the ratio can be arbitrarily close to 3. Let y1 = −1, y2 = 1, and
let x1 = . . . = xn−1 = −1 and xn = 1. Therefore the costs are: SC(C1,x) = 1 +  = SC(OPT,x)
and SC(C2,x) = 2(n− 1) + (1− ).
Ergo: SC(RD,x) = n−1n · SC(C1,x) + 1n · SC(C2,x) = 3 − 2n + 2n + . The approximation
ratio is therefore:
SC(RD,x)
SC(OPT,x)
=
3− 2n + 2n + 
1 + 
= 3− 2+
2
n − 2n
1 + 
Clearly this ratio tends to 3 as n→∞, → 0.
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We now show that the approximation ratio is bounded from above by 3. The social cost is:
SC(RD,x) =
1
n
∑
i
∑
j
|xj − y(ai)|

≤ 1
n
∑
i
∑
j
|xj − yopt|+ |yopt − y(ai)|

≤ 1
n
∑
i
∑
j
|xj − yopt|+ |yopt − xi|+ |xi − y(ai)|

≤ 1
n
∑
i
∑
j
|xj − yopt|+ 2|yopt − xi|

=
1
n
∑
i
∑
j
|xj − yopt|
+ 1
n
∑
i
∑
j
2|yopt − xi|

=
1
n
∑
j
(
|xj − yopt|
∑
i
(1)
)
+
2
n
∑
i
|yopt − xi|∑
j
(1)

=
1
n
∑
j
(|xj − yopt| · n) + 2
n
∑
i
(|yopt − xi| · n)
= SC(OPT,x) + 2 · SC(OPT,x) = 3 · SC(OPT,x)
The first two transitions hold due to the triangle inequality, and the third inequality holds
due to fact that no candidate is closer to xi than y(ai) is.
Notice that this holds in any metric space since we only used the triangle inequality, and
did not use any notion which is specific to the line.
A mechanism is group-strategyproof (GSP) if for any location profile and any coalition S ⊆
N , there is no joint deviation of the agents in S from the truthful reports such that they all
gain. That is:
∀S ⊆ N, ∀aS ∈ A(xS), ∀a−S ∈ An−|S|, ∀a′S ∈ A|S|,∃i ∈ S :
costxi(M, (aS , a−S)) ≤ costxi(M, (a′S , a−S))
In the continuous model, random dictator is GSP on the line (and even on the circle, see
[2]). We show that in our candidate model random dictator is not GSP on the line. Notice that
random dictator is in particular a WPV mechanism, therefore a corollary of the lemma is that
there exist WPV mechanisms which are not GSP.
Lemma 31. Random dictator is not group group-strategyproof
Proof. Let there be three candidates at locations y1 = 1, y2 = 0, y3 = 1 and let there be two
agents at x1 = −0.51 and x2 = 0.51. When both agents report truthfully (a1 = C1, a2 = C3),
the mechanism chooses C1, C3, each with probability 0.5. The cost of each of the agents in this
case is: costx1(RD,a) = costx2(RD,a) = 0.5 · (0.51 + 1.49) = 1.
However, if both agents misreport together to a′ = (a′1 = C2, a′2 = C2), then C2 will always
be chosen. The costs in this case will be: costx1(RD,a
′) = costx2(RD,a′) = 0.51.
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A.4 Missing Proofs from Section 6
Proof. of Lemma 21: This mechanism is truthful - any agent located at the median location
has no incentive to misreport since the only possible consequence is for the mechanism to select
a different location. Similarly, other agents have no incentive to misreport, since misreporting
either has no effect or moves the chosen location further away.
We now move on to the approximation ratio - Let pi be the permutation of {1 . . . n} such
that y
(
api(i)
) ≤ (api(i+1)) for each i ∈ {1 . . . n− 1}. Denote aˆi = api(i). The median mechanism
chooses candidate Cj = aˆdn/2e located at yj .
Assume without loss of generality that yopt > yj . The social cost of median is:
SC(M,a) = SC(Cj ,a) =
∑
i:y(aˆi)≤yj
|xi − yj |+
∑
k:y(aˆk)>yj
|xi − yj |
Denote the first term as α, and the second as β.
The social cost to the optimal candidate is:
SC(OPT,x) =
∑
i:y(aˆi)≤yj
|xi − yopt|+
∑
k:y(aˆk)>yj
|xi − yopt|
Denote the first term by γ, and the second by δ.
It is easy to see that α ≤ γ since for any agent i in these sums (agent whose favorite
candidate is not right of yj): |xi − yj | ≤ |xi − yopt|, and this obviously holds when taking the
sum.
We now show that β ≤ α + γ + δ, due to the following inequalities (justifications for the
transitions appear below):
β =
∑
k:aˆk>yj
|xk − yj |
≤
∑
k:aˆk>yj
|yj − yopt|+
∑
k:aˆk>yj
|yopt − xk|
=
∑
k:aˆk>yj
|yj − yopt|+ δ
≤
∑
i:y(aˆi)≤yj
|yj − yopt|+ δ
≤
∑
i:y(aˆi)≤yj
(|yj − xi|+ |xi − yopt|) + δ = α+ γ + δ
The inequalities in the second and fifth lines hold due to the triangle inequality, and the in-
equality in the fourth line holds because we are summing over a greater or equal amount of
non-negative numbers (since |i : y(aˆi) ≤ yj | ≥ |k : y(aˆk) > yj |).
Putting this all together:
SC(Cj ,x)
SC(OPT,x)
=
α+ β
γ + δ
≤ γ + α+ γ + δ
γ + δ
≤ 3γ + δ
γ + δ
≤ 3γ + 3δ
γ + δ
= 3
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